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This essay is an exploration of the potential ofmodern scientific linguistic study to provide
insight into the ways of God.
The nature and power of language
There is an intimate connection between
language and religion. The religious
impulse of humankind expresses itself in
manifold ways: sacred meals, visual arts,
instrumental music, construction of holy
spaces, offering of incense, ritual dance,
ascetic postures and control of the breath, to
name just a few. We tend, however, to
identify the core expressions of faith with
the operation of our linguistic faculty:
prayer, hymnody, writing and reading of
sacred texts, and the articulation of creeds.
Indeed, our nonlinguistic expressions of
faith often require the consecration of sacred
words in order to qualify as holy. Islamic
decorative art, for example, escapes from the
prohibition against graven images simply
because it developed from the exquisite
stylization of the letters of the Qur'an.
The Christian tradition, in particular,
exhibits an insistent orality in all of its forms
of piety. Ritual acts, which might be
performed wordlessly in other faiths, are
always accompanied by language in
Christianity. Incense is never offered
without psalms and prayers; ancient and
medieval Christian music made no use of
instruments except as an accompaniment for
the human voice. Unlike the silent Japanese
tea ceremony, the Christian Eucharistic meal
cannot be accomplished without the spoken
words of consecration. Eastern Orthodox
piety considers an icon to be uncanonical
unless it bears a superscription with the
name of the saint or feast depicted. Even the
Christian form of "yoga," of meditative
prayer and breath-control, is effected only in
conjunction with the repetition of the Jesus
prayer. The logocentric impulses of the
Christian tradition are even more distilled in
Reformational theology, which tends to
favor verbal expressions of faith to the
exclusion of all others, especially the visual
arts.
This insistent orality of Christianity
should probably come as no surprise, since
we find that already in the earliest decades
the Church's theologians were willing to
elevate the very noun ^oyo^,' "word," to the
status of a divine name. One might even
argue that Christianity inherited this close
connection between language and God as a
legacy from Judaism, whose God revealed
the inner life of the divine Self in the words
of the Torah, and whose prophets were
moved by God's Spirit to monumental
poetic feats. The Biblical God also creates
the world—not by laying a cosmic egg, nor
by dividing up the corpse of the vanquished
enemy-but by speaking: "By the word of
the Lord the heavens were made, And all the
host of them by the breath of God's mouth"
(Psalm 33:6).
Being fashioned in the divine image, all
human enterprises show a spark of this
creative fire of God, but it is in the realm of
language that humanity realizes its greatest
similitude to the Creator. Humankind
effects all other achievements in the arts and
sciences through the refining, reworking,
and reordering of existing materials: rocks,
trees, oil, water, and plants become by our
hands buildings, baseball bats, books, bread,
and bassoons. But in no enterprise do we
make something out of nothing, except in
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our use of language. All humans who have
the faculty of speech are capable in theory of
uttering (or signing) an infinite number of •
sentences that have never been uttered
before, of inventing new words, of telling
new stories, of making a verbal thing that
never existed before.
The philosopher J. L. Austin was the
first to give a name to a particular feature of
human linguistic creativity, the performative
speech act. A performative speech act is an
utterance that accomplishes something in the
Is in the realm oflanguage that humanity
realizes its greatest similitude to the Creator.
In no enterprise do we make something out
of nothing, except in our use oflanguage.
physical world merely by its vocalization.
For example, a promise, an oath, and an
apology are all created by the utterance of
the following sentences:
I promise that I will wash the car tomorrow.
I swear that I never saw him before..
I apologize for being so tardy.
Sometimes in order for a speech act to have
performative force, certain contextual
conditions must be met: the sentence,
I christen thee the 'Santa Maria.'
actually names a boat, just in case the
speaker is breaking a bottle of champagne
across the bow of a sailing vessel. Contex-
tual conditions for other performatives, such
as,
I now pronounce you man and wife,
or,
I bet you five dollars and a beer.
are well defined by societal conventions. In
any case, through the utterance of these
speech acts a human being has actually
created a thing—an abstract and intangible
thing, to be sure, but a thing nonetheless,
one that never existed before the moment of
its utterance. Indeed, through a
performative speech act one may create
something that never existed before in the
history of the world. For example, an
almost certainly unique sentence, such as the
following,
I promise to name my next ferret "Betty," in
honor of the B.T.I.
creates an obligation where there was none
before—ex nihilo, one might even say.
Language, then, is not only intimately,
connected with our sundry exercises of
religious feeling, but it is also integral to our
composition as the imago dei, inasmuch as
we reflect the image of the Creator in all our
If performative speech acts.
In a singular way (accord-
ing to the sensibilities of
the peoples of the Book, at
least), the Divine nature
clothes Itself for us in
language. The metaphor of
I language as Divine
1 clothing suggests that the
study of language may allow privileged
insights into the Divine reality, that is, into
the actions and energies of God. For
example, if a chest of clothing from some
unknown civilization were to wash up on the
beach, we could garner many significant
insights about the culture of that alien
people simply from an examination of their
garments: what their average height and
weight are, the climate of their land, their
level of technological achievement, and
perhaps even what they eat (judging from
stains on their apparel). Indeed, from the
range of hues in which their garments were
dyed we may even have a guess at their skin
color, and from their choice to expose
certain parts of the body and to cover others
we may even have a glimpse into their
notions of the erotic! Likewise, by examin-
ing human language as the clothing of God,
we may derive some insights into the
workings of the Divine nature.
Some elements of grammatical theory
Linguistics over the last century has
come to a consensus that it is less appropri-
ate to speak of human grammars than to
speak of human grammar. The singular
noun better conveys the linguistic notion
that human beings have, by an innate
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endowment, a common language faculty that
operates within certain prescribed param-
eters. This single abstract grammar is
worked out in different ways by different
languages; but in a very real sense, all
languages share a common set of principles
according to which some constructions are
grammatical and others are ungrammatical
in every language.
One example of a deep grammatical
principle can be found in English contrac-
tion "rules." Sentence (1) has two mean-
ings:
(1) Which relatives do you want to visit?
In the first reading we understand the
question to ask which relatives the
interrogatee would like to entertain as
guests, and in the second reading we
understand the question to ask which
relatives the interrogatee would like to go
and see. These meanings correspond- to the
following underlying structures, respec-
tively.
(2a) You want [which relatives to visit]?
(2b) You want [to visit which relatives]?
Sentence (1), however, can be pronounced
with a contracted verb form, so that "want
to" comes out as "wanna," as in (3). (The
merits or demerits of such contractions are
outside of the scope of this essay.)
(3) Which relative do you wanna visit?
Curiously, though, sentence (3) has only the
meaning of (2b); it cannot have the meaning
of (2a), in which the interrogatee would act
as the host of visiting relatives. Perhaps this
is because in such a case the contraction
would have to take place across the syntactic
gap left by the preposed noun phrase:
(4a) Which relatives do you want [__ to visit].
For the meaning conveyed by (2b), however,
"want" and "to" are not separated in the
underlying form by the movable noun
phrase, and so the contraction rule finds no
gap to jump over:
(4b) Which relatives do you want [to visit ].
Speakers of English are quite unani-
mous in their judgments of the different
potential meanings of sentences (1) and (3),
though quite at a loss to explain why there is
a difference or when they learned this fact
about the contraction of "want to" to
"wanna." In a roomful of Anglophones of
different ages, from different parts Of the
country, and of different backgrounds, one
might find no other point of universal
agreement than this fact, that sentence (1)
has two possible meanings and sentence (3)
has only one. Linguists have learned,
moreover, that gaps left hy transposed words
or phrases affect meanings in many lan-
guages.
An example of a universal grammatical
proscription can be found in the following
sentences:
(5a) Most drivers who own their own truck like
to wash it once a week.
(5b) Most self-employed truckdrivers like to
wash it once a week.
(5c) Most self-employed truckers like to wash it
once a week.
In (5a), the pronoun "it" may have the
preceding word "truck" as its antecedent (or
it may refer to another rtoun in an earlier
sentence not recorded here, such as "laun-
dry"). In sentence (5b) and (5c), however,
the pronoun it cannot be construed as having
as its antecedent the word truck in the
morphologically complex nouns
"truckdrivers" or "truckers"; the pronoun
must find its antecedent in some preceding
sentence. (Or, if there is no salient noun in
the preceding discourse, the word-// in
English may often be construed as referring
to some taboo entity.) There seems to be a
rule that says that a pronoun cannot look
inside of a compound noun or a derived
form in order to find its antecedent.
Again, these judgments of possible and
impossible meanings are held unanimously
by all native speakers of English and are
matched by similar grammatical judgments
of like constructions by native speakers of
other languages. This is true, despite the
fact that none of us had a lecture in seventh-
grade English (or Dutch or Swahili) class on
the impossibility of nouns within com-
pounds to act as antecedents for a pronoun—
or on the semantic possibilities of sentences
with verbal contractions, for that matter.
This bedrock of common knowledge about
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our own languages is unconscious and
untaught but very deeply known in the sense
that we never break these rules through
carelessness or ignorance, not even as
children at an imperfect stage of learning
our native languages. The parameters of
possible meaning for contractions and
pronouns seem somehow to be part of our
basic linguistic endowment, part of the
"universal grammar" of human speech.
In discovering that certain aspects of
language are innate and, therefore, a matter
of biological endowment, we discover that
human language has certain limits of
expression. Where there are parameters,
there are necessarily boundaries. As we find
the core principles of possible human
grammars, we discover also that certain
conceivable constructions are impossible for
humans beings to learn as their native
language. For example, there are languages
with accentuation systems in which stress
falls on the first or last syllable (Finnish and.
French, respectively, on the penultimate
syllable (Polish), and on the antepenultimate
syllable (Macedonian), but none with stress
on the fourth-to-last syllable. It seems that
human grammar just cannot count that high.
Furthermore, in the Australian language
Yidiri y , the stress falls on all odd-numbered
syllables (first, third, fifth) except when one
of the even-numbered syllables has a long
All who cherish a sacred text must admit
that the God of eternity has accepted a sort
of circumscription in choosing to be revealed
in a limited set of words composed in a lim-
ited human grammar.
vowel, in which case stress falls on the
even-numbered syllables. Such a stress
system is very complicated: it would be far
less complicated to have a stress rule that
says, "Stress the last syllable if there is an
odd number of syllables in a word, and the
first syllable if there is an even number." No
language, however, has a rule like this. Core
human grammar, it seems, can count in
some ways but not in others. Language is
both infinite in its power to express new
ideas and yet finite in its function, like all
other human faculties.
Theological inferences
Some reflections arise from this brief
study of grammatical theory. First, although
linguistics has made the case that certain
deep principles govern the grammar of all
human languages, we must not lose sight of
the fact that, in many ways, our languages
vary considerably: we may use different
sounds or different orderings of verb and
direct object, or different classifications of
grammatical gender for nouns, and so on.
That is to say, despite our common linguistic
endowment, we still have managed in our
various cultures to devise wildly divergent
systems of communications. We could all
have the same syntax or phonology, but we
do not. Such is not the case with animal
communications systems: dogs have
basically the same set of barks and cats the
came set of meows and hisses, whether they
live in Mexico or Malawi or Massachusetts.
So while there is a certain core consistency
to human language, there is also a certain
innate possibility for great diversity. The
task of discerning what is a core principle of
language and what is a culture-specific
feature of a given language is often difficult;
the distinction between core and periphery
II in grammar emerges
only through the study
of many languages.
This means that in order
to discover our core
human grammar, we
cannot limit our
\ investigations to our
native language alone.
Second, linguists have noted that,
despite the fact that humans have strong and
consistent judgments about the
grammaticality of certain constructions in
their native language, they almost never
have such clear intuitions about similar
constructions in a language that is not their
mother tongue. When we learn a second
language after a certain age "(generally
considered to be around the onset of
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puberty), our ability to have native intuitions
is lost—even if our first language behaves
very similarly to our second language in
most respects. For example, Dutch is quite
similar to its sister language English, but the
two languages differ
markedly in whether
they allow a preposition
to be "stranded," that is,
left behind when its
object has been moved
to the front of the
sentence. The two
sentences in (6) have the
same meaning, but the 11
Dutch sentence is ungrammatical (as -
indicated by the asterisk), whereas the
English sentence would be -accepted by most
native speakers.
'
(6a) *Welke vrouwen hebben jullie over
gesproken? [Which women have you (pi.)
about spoken?]
(6b) Which women have you spoken about?
Simply put, an English speaker must be
taught this fact about Dutch, whereas seven-
year-old Dutch children know this fact about
their language even before their first lessons
in grammar. This means that in our investi-
gation of human language in all its variety,
we cannot rely on ourselves alone: we
require the collegial cooperation of linguists
from every language background. Whereas
in physics or chemistry or anatomy, a single
scientist or a monocultural group of scien-
tists have equal access to the raw data of
their subject of inquiry, in linguistics we can
advance only in a community of diverse
scholars informing one another about the
facts of our native languages. We can find
our own innate human grammar, in other
words, only by interacting with and learning
from those who are linguistically different.
Let us return to the metaphor of
language as Divine clothing. Consider again
the hypothetical chest of clothes that washed
ashore from an unknown civilization.
Suppose we examined these garments and
discovered that no article of clothing cOuld
be put on by one person alone, but that the
arrangement of buttons or hooks or ties
required that the one donning the apparel
seek help from another person, who must
stand facing the wearer of the garment. This
fact would tell us a great deal about the
sociology of our unknown culture: their
notion of community would have to be
The God who created language hasforced
humankind, in its investigations of language,
to face one another, toform a community, to
lookfor ourselves in the other, and to find
our unity in our diversity.
refined to a very high degree. And yet this
is precisely what we have found in our study
of Divine clothing. The God who created
language, and who through language reveals
the ways of Divinity, and who in acts of
religious language meets humanity, has
forced humankind, in its investigations of
language, to face one another, to form a
community, to look for ourselves in the
other, and to find our unity in our diversity.
In other words, we have in the linguistic
enterprise an icon of the doctrine of the
Trinity. Unity in diversity, diversity in unity,
a mutual interpenetration of essence and a
mutual self-discovery in community—this is
classic Christian triadology. The Divine
nature that clothes Itself in language is
making a point for us about the makeup of
the Divine life, and even more, invites us
through linguistic study to participate
vicariously in the Divine communal mode of
existence.
Finally, the combination of infinite
expressive power in a finite faculty reminds
us that the infinite God, through condescen-
sion, is clothed in the finite workings of
human speech. This observation holds,
regardless of one's faith tradition: all who
cherish a sacred text must admit that the
God of eternity has accepted a sort of
circumscription in choosing to be revealed
in a limited set of words composed in a
limited human grammar. In this sense, the
inscripturation of Divine revelation stands as
a type of the Christian belief in the Incarna-
tion, the consummate Divine act of conde-
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scension through the human enfleshment of
the Son of God.
The intimate connection between faith
and language, therefore, gives us hope that
through the study of grammar we might
learn more about this God of community
and condescension Who meets us in our
prayers.
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